1 Eugene Garfield "Fluoridation, 'Texas Teeth', and the Great Conspiracy" (1986) discussion of new research developments in this area, 10 meaning that those developments could have a greater impact on the legality of fluoridation.
Thus far, there has been a lack of current and reliable research undertaken in regard to the safety of fluoridation. The most comprehensive recent report is the York Review on Water
Fluoridation (2000), 11 which was itself critical of the amount of evidence available about fluoridation. 12 Closer to home, the Royal Society of New Zealand has undertaken a review of the available scientific research on the safety and efficacy of fluoride. 13 The report concluded that community water fluoridation provides dental benefits, and does not pose a risk to public health. 14 Nevertheless, new scientific developments may emerge and change the nature of this debate. The role of future research will depend very much on whether the reasoning in New Health is followed in subsequent cases, or whether its flaws are recognised and corrected. It is thus imperative to explore the interpretation of New Health and to highlight the defects of the decision, as the definition of s 11 remains central to the legal landscape surrounding the fluoridation debate.
This paper intends to establish that a combination of erroneous reasoning led to the incorrect conclusion that fluoridation does not constitute medical treatment. Initially, the paper will provide a background of fluoridation and the debate surrounding it. The paper then summarises the reasoning and result in New Health. It should be noted the scope of this paper is limited and will not involve an extensive discussion of the issues in the case that are not connected with s 11, as the scope of s 11 is the issue most in need of rectification.
Part IV analyses three main points of the reasoning in New Health. First, the wording of s 11 was improperly interpreted and does not require a limitation of medical treatment.
Second, the policy analysis used to support a limited definition of s 11 is out of place at the 
III The Decision in New Health
In 2012, the South Taranaki District Council (the Council) made the decision to fluoridate the water supplies of Patea and Wavereley, in South Taranaki. This decision was challenged by New Health, by way of judicial review.
27
Section 11 of BORA was central to the arguments and decision in New Health. Section 11
states that "everyone has the right to refuse to undergo any medical treatment", 28 and is part of a group of rights which "recognise the right to dignity and security of the person". 29 The right has been interpreted broadly, and held to cover instances such as psychological testing with a therapeutic purpose, and a medical examination of children relating to their health and safety. 30 As anticipated by the White Paper, 31 the majority of issues that have arisen thus far in relation to s 11 have regarded the nature of consent required by the section. 32 In contrast, New Health focused on the interpretation of medical treatment.
While New Health did challenge the Council's power to fluoridate, 33 this argument was not successful as the High Court held that the Council had a "clear legislative mandate" to add fluoride to drinking water supplies. 34 The bulk of the case involved discussion of the legality of fluoridation in relation to BORA, with New Health alleging that the fluoridation of public water supplies was a breach of s 11 that was not prescribed by law and that was an unjustified and disproportionate limit on s 11. 35 Hansen J's reasoning in this area will be elaborated on below, but his Honour concluded that fluoridation is not medical treatment and therefore does not fall within the scope of s 11. 36 New Health also raised a number of arguments about the Council's decision making process, arguing that the Council failed to take into account a series of mandatory relevant considerations. 37 However, the majority of these considerations related to the alleged breach of BORA, 38 and these arguments were therefore not successful. Overall, this cause of action also failed.
39
New Health was unsuccessful in regard to each argument raised. Their applications for declarations regarding the decision being both ultra vires and in breach of BORA, and a further application for an order quashing the decision, all failed.
40

IV
Analysis of the Interpretation of Section 11 in New Health
Certain aspects of the above reasoning require a more detailed analysis. This Part will undertake an analysis of the way that the wording of s 11 was used to limit the section, the policy considerations used to support that limitation, and, the application of a de minimis approach.
A The Wording of Section 11
When using the wording of s 11 to determine the scope of medical treatment, Hansen J acknowledged that the purpose of an intervention is relevant to whether it is medical treatment. 41 In order for something to be medical treatment, it must have a therapeutic purpose. 42 Hansen J concluded that fluoridation clearly has a therapeutic objective as it is "a process undertaken for the purpose of preventing or arresting a disease": dental caries.
43
Despite this, his Honour held that the wording of s 11 meant something more than just a therapeutic purpose was required, and that s 11 can only apply to the treatment of an individual, as opposed to treatment administered to groups. 44 This conclusion was reached after Hansen J found that "the terms of s 11 themselves indicate that medical treatment is of a more limited scope". 45 Section 11 protects a right to refuse to "undergo" medical treatment without consent, and Hansen J asserted that the word 'undergoing' cannot be applied comfortably to the process of drinking fluoridated water and, further, that fluoridation is more likely to be described as something that is 'done' to a patient.
46
protect rights not to be subjected to torture or cruel treatment and not to be subjected to either medical or scientific experimentation respectively. 48 inclusion of "subject to" in ss 9 and 10 means that those rights cover a broader range of activities, while s 11 has a narrower scope due to the use of "undergo".
49
This reasoning led Hansen J to the preliminary conclusion that "the right to refuse medical treatment is only engaged when the treatment takes place in the context of a therapeutic relationship in which medical services are provided to an individual."
50
The Court was wrong to reach this conclusion, as the wording of s 11 does not clearly require a limitation. Firstly, the difference in wording between ss 9 and 10, and s 11, may be due to the divergent nature of these rights. Torture and scientific or medical experimentation are quite different concepts to medical treatment, and it is logical that the verbs used in regard to them are different to those used in relation to medical treatment. The Oxford Dictionary defines 'subject' as: "… to cause or force someone or something to undergo … a particular experience or form of treatment, typically an unwelcome or unpleasant one". 51 This emphasises that 'subject to' is likely to be used in regard to especially negative situations.
The concepts in ss 9 and 10 have more obviously negative connotations than s 11, supported by the fact that s 10 is based on art 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 52 which protects people from torture and cruel treatment and was "a response to the atrocities of Nazi concentration camps".
53
Secondly, the difference in wording may also be due to the way the activities relevant to the different rights would be conducted. Sections 9 and 10 use "subject to", envisaging activities that would be forced upon people. The use of "undergo" in s 11 is a more appropriate word for s 11, which is intended to apply to treatment that is optionally undertaken. Medical treatment with consent, envisaged by s 11, is benign and is not likely to be something people are 'subjected to'.
These alternate explanations reach the opposite conclusion to Hansen J, indicating that ss 9
and 10 may in fact be of a narrower scope than s 11. Another available counter argument to the Court's reasoning is that if Parliament only wanted this right to apply to treatment of an individual, a limitation could have been expressed in the wording of the section. The absence of such wording implies that rights can be applied both to conduct towards individuals, and to conduct applied to groups. Further, neither s 10 of BORA nor art 7 of the ICCPR specify that they are intended to apply to groups of people, but this is clearly the case, considering the history of the sections, 54 as a number of Nazi concentration camps conducted experiments involving treatment being administered to groups of people simultaneously. 55 Logically it should be presumed that the right in s 10 applies to similar situations, rather than just to treatment and experimentation administered to individuals. Therefore, the fact that a right does not specifically state that it covers administration of treatment to a group of individuals does not necessarily mean such an application would be outside the ambit of the right's protection.
The wording of s 11 does not, on its own, stipulate that the scope of medical treatment should be limited to direct treatment of individuals.
B Policy Reasoning in New Health
Hansen J concluded that the policy implications relevant to limiting the scope of medical treatment supported a restrictive reading of s 11. 56 This reasoning is flawed as it overestimates the ability of individuals to veto public health measures. Further, Hansen J mimics the approach of United States authorities, resulting in a structure of reasoning that is not appropriate in the New Zealand context and that does not adequately reflect the purpose of s 11. These factors lead to a definition that has problematic implications.
A pivotal point in this section of reasoning was that s 11 should be limited to the direct treatment of an individual, as "within that sphere there are no competing interests that need to be moderated or resolved." 57 Hansen J argued that the right should not be engaged where the state employs public health interventions, because "were it otherwise, the individual's However, the pervasiveness of fluoridation can be linked to the fact that extensive measures must be used to combat dental caries, as it is such a widespread issue. 66 Many public health measures will not be so extensive and will not be impractical to refuse.
For example, Hansen J asserted that the addition of folic acid to bread is comparable to fluoridation, and that as a public health measure it would not constitute medical treatment. Another flaw of the policy reasoning in New Health is that it implicitly assumes that, if fluoridation or another public health measure were to be considered medical treatment, the implementation of such a measure would be an unjustifiable breach of the right to refuse medical treatment. Hansen J neglects to outline that a breach of s 11 could be justifiable under s 5, which states that BORA rights "may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". 72 Section 5 means that BORA rights can be subject to reasonable limits. If fluoridation was held to be a reasonable limit on s 11, an individual would not be able to prevent or stop it, as s 5 would prevent them from establishing a breach. The failure to explain this further undermines the reasoning in this section.
Structural Issues
Hansen J's use of policy concerns to limit the definition of s 11 is also problematic, as those concerns should instead have been discussed under a s 5 analysis.
The structure Hansen J follows is reminiscent of the approach taken in the United States cases relating to this issue. 73 In some instances, examination of relevant policy concerns can Another relevant consideration is that interpreting rights broadly can lead to situations which may be either beneficial for society or quite trivial, needing to be justified pursuant to s 5.
This places a costly burden, 98 usually on the Crown, 99 which has to prove both that the action is prescribed by law and that it is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. Of course, the need for protection of rights means that this alone is not enough reason to conclude that all rights should be limited. However, it does mean the purpose of a right should be considered carefully in relation to the facts of a particular case, and that a right should be limited if a wide interpretation would lead to trivial or overwhelmingly beneficial actions needing to be justified under s 5.
Overall, BORA interpretation should follow a purposive approach, which involves identifying the purpose of the right and using that to determine its scope. This can indicate whether or not a right should be limited at an early stage of reasoning. As noted by Rishworth, 100 the New Zealand courts have endorsed the purposive approach, 101 and are likely to follow something similar to this Canadian approach:
102
The meaning of a right or freedom … [must] be understood … in the light of the interests it was meant to protect. … The interpretation should be a generous rather than a legalistic one … [but, at] the same time, it is important not to overshoot the actual purpose of the right or freedom in question.
Section 11
Section 11 does not contain an internal qualifier, as it contains no word that by its nature requires evaluation. A more pertinent issue is that of whether public health measures do or 96 Rishworth, above n 91, at 12. 97 For an example, see the debate around the right to be free from discrimination: Rishworth and others, above n 26, at 375-376; and Butler and Butler, above n 29, at 17. The fact that s 11 is a narrowly stated right lends further support to requiring s 5 justification for fluoridation and similar public health measures. Broadly framed rights, like freedom of expression, are more likely to require limits as their already wide scope creates a higher chance for trivial issues to lead to prima facie breaches, or for activities which are clearly outside the scope of the purpose to be covered by the broad wording of the right. 119 The narrowness of s 11 means that its purpose is particularly clear; it protects a specific right relating to bodily autonomy, rather than a broad right to liberty. Such a specific intention should not be ignored or limited without good reason.
A Preferable Approach
A preferable approach would be for s 11 to be interpreted broadly to include any medical treatment that has a therapeutic purpose. 120 If this were the case, fluoridation would be a prima facie breach of the right and would have to be justified under s 5. (ii) does the limiting measure impair the right or freedom no more than is reasonably necessary for sufficient achievement of its purpose? (iii) is the limit in due proportion to the importance of the objective These steps were followed by Hansen J in New Health. His Honour concluded that if fluoridation did engage the s 11 right, fluoridation is prescribed by law and would be a demonstrably justified breach of s 11 pursuant to s 5 of BORA. 122 However, this discussion was brief and not decisive, as Hansen J had already concluded that fluoridation is not medical treatment.
A s 5 analysis should encompass policy considerations like those discussed by Hansen J regarding the scope of medical treatment. For example, the need to limit an individual's ability to veto a measure that is beneficial for others would be relevant, as that would relate to whether the limiting measure impairs the right or freedom no more than is reasonably necessary for sufficient achievement of its purpose. It could be argued that fluoridation would be a reasonable limitation on the right of a small number of individuals who wished to refuse to the treatment, because of the overall benefit that it would provide for the community.
While this approach would lead to discussion of the same policy concerns raised in New Health, it is preferable because it is more likely to give effect to the purpose of BORA, which is to protect individuals from abuse of power by the state and to "provide a minimum set of standards to which public decision making must conform. also less likely to be engaged. In the case of public health measures, it seems logical that the state should be required to prove, on the balance of probabilities, 124 the reasonableness and proportionality of a measure, rather than public health measures being excluded from the scope of s 11. If a measure could not be justified under s 5, citizens would then be able to assert their s 11 right to stop it from being implemented. This approach would add to the beneficial creation of what Andrew Butler, crediting late South African scholar Etienne
Mureinik refers to as a culture of justification. 125 In such a culture, "citizens are entitled to call upon the provision of reasons for measures that affect their rights" and, "are entitled to expect that in advance of impairment thought will have been given to the reasonableness of a particular limit". 126 If public health measures do not have to be justified, there is less of an incentive for the state to investigate their reasonableness, and no option for citizens to question that reasonableness or the necessity of the measure under BORA.
A possible counter to above arguments is the fact that the courts have already read in a limit on the s 11 right, as only those who are competent to understand the nature of the medical treatment relevant to them can make decisions regarding refusal and consent. 127 However, that limitation is acceptable as the need to read in a limit on the word "everyone" in s 11 was clear and in accordance with the purpose of the section. right, 132 as it is the type of consent valued by society. A limit on "everyone" is therefore not in conflict with the purpose of s 11 which intends to protect refusal by those who can give informed consent. In contrast, the limit that Hansen J read into medical treatment is not in line with the purpose of s 11 and is not obviously justified by any other reason. In order to best protect the rights and freedoms of individuals, limitations should only be read into rights when clearly necessary.
Problems with the Definition Reached
The scope of s 11 was outlined as follows:
133
Medical treatment is confined to direct interference with the body or state of mind of an individual and does not extend to public health interventions delivered to the inhabitants of a particular locality or the population at large.
There are two main parts to this definition. The first, the idea that medical treatment requires direct interference, supports the second part of the definition, the conclusion that medical treatment does not cover public health interventions. This result and the narrowed scope of s 11 have the potential to lead to problematic consequences which are not in accordance with the purpose of s 11.
A hypothetical scenario illustrates the shortcomings of this definition. If, in response to the outbreak of a disease, antibiotics were introduced to the water supply of South Auckland, individuals would not be able make a challenge via s 11. As a public health measure, this would not be 'medical treatment', even though it would involve the exact same components as something ordinarily thought of as medical treatment. 144 The right at issue in Millership was a very broad one, 145 and the application of a de minimis threshold may be a tool the Canadian system uses to limit such broad rights. The same approach is not necessarily applicable to the much narrower right protected by s 11.
In Police v Smith and Herewini, which involved application of s 23 to the taking of blood from a drink driving subject pursuant to the Transport Act 1962, 146 materiality of breach was considered important. This was discussed specifically when defining detention. 147 
Relevance of De Minimis to Section 11
The applicability of the de minimis approach to s 11 should have been better scrutinised in New Health. The submissions for New Health included more detail on this issue, with the submissions on behalf of the Attorney General stating:
154 Section 11 also invites the application of a de minimis threshold … If the addition of a therapeutic or preventative compound to water were to constitute medical treatment, the effect on the individual must be more than trivial or transient before it could give rise in any meaningful sense to a right to refuse it. The Council submitted that "If the Court were to consider fluoridation is a medical treatment which cannot be refused, it is submitted that fluoridation of water is nevertheless a trivial breach of that right", 155 an approach which most closely resembles that taken by Hansen J.
In contrast, New Health submitted: 156 There is no such thing as a trivial or de minimis breach of the right simply because the treatment could be considered relatively minor.
In order to determine whether a de minimis threshold should be applied to s 11, it is appropriate to revisit the purpose of the right. As already outlined, the purpose of s 11 is not only to protect physical integrity, but also to prevent decision making autonomy.
157
Applying a de minimis threshold is not in accordance with those purposes. As New Health submitted, this would mean the right would not be engaged if someone was forced to take paracetamol. 158 While the physical impacts of that are likely to be minor, it would be an action taken with disregard to the autonomy of that person and would negatively impact their bodily integrity. Application of a de minimis threshold would not acknowledge that it is the ability to refuse treatment, rather than the reasons behind refusal, that is important.
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Such a threshold would be in direct conflict with the purposes of s 11, as it would restrict the element of choice that the right intends to provide and only allow recourse in relation to treatments of a certain level of seriousness. 160 This issue may be further elaborated on by the courts, as application of a de minimis threshold is likely to be especially relevant if future research into fluoride demonstrates that those who consume fluoridated water are negatively impacted. The above analysis evinces that the application of a de minimis threshold to s 11 would disregard the core purposes of the right.
V Conclusion
The decision in New Health has resulted in a definition of s 11 of BORA that gives the state greater leeway to infringe on the rights of New Zealanders, without having to justify its actions.
The definition reached was limited in a way that is not required by the wording of s 11, and the policy reasoning used to support that definition was flawed. While a desire to allow beneficial public health measures to continue is understandable, the measure taken in New Health in response to that desire was misguided. A major hindrance to the reasoning in New
Health is the structure that Hansen J followed, as it too closely resembles the reasoning in the United States cases and thus takes a stance which is out of place in the New Zealand context. This structure led to a definition that is at odds with the purpose of s 11, and which may allow the bodily integrity of groups of individuals to be violated. Further, the de minimis concept was not given enough attention and should not be applied to s 11.
A preferable outcome would involve a definition of s 11 that included public health measures, like fluoridation. It can only be hoped that the interpretation of s 11 in New Health will be rectified, when the decision comes before the Court of Appeal.
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